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Introduction 
 
The headline read: “Questions Arise over Criminal Background Searches of 
Jurors in D.C. Superior Court.”1 The story was even more troubling than the 
headline. A prosecutor at the United States Attorney’s Office, arguably the 
country’s most respected prosecutors’ office, doubted that some African Ameri-
can prospective jurors were telling the truth when they denied or failed to an-
swer questions about having been arrested during voir dire inquiry.2 The prose-
cutor searched a law enforcement database and learned that some of the 
prospective jurors in fact did have arrest records.3 The prosecutor raised the is-
sue with the trial judge and asked that the prospective jurors be stricken for 
cause for lying under oath.4 
An inquiry from the trial judge revealed that the prosecutor had not 
searched the database for the arrest records of every prospective juror on the 
panel, but only for the African Americans.5 When asked by the judge about why 
she had only run the records of those particular jurors, the prosecutor respond-
ed that she had an “instinct” about some jurors and also gave an answer that 
she had run those jurors’ records because the jurors were life-long residents of 
the District of Columbia.6 In the rapidly gentrifying District of Columbia, large 
portions of the White residents are transplants from other jurisdictions, while 
many of African Americans are life-long residents.7 The prosecutor’s response 
was a thinly veiled admission that her suspicions were based on the jurors’ race. 
Questions about a prospective juror’s arrests do not bear directly on his or 
her fitness as a juror. Many jurisdictions bar those with felony convictions from 
serving as jurors permanently or for some period of time.8 A handful of states 
bar individuals with misdemeanor convictions from serving on juries.9 Some 
states also bar citizens facing pending charges.10 The District of Columbia 
blocks only those with felony convictions in the last ten years from serving as 
 1. Keith L. Alexander, Questions Arise Over Criminal Background Searches of Jurors in 
D.C. Superior Court, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
local/crime/questions-arise-over-criminal-background-searches-of-jurors-in-dc-
superior-court/2013/12/08/fa612fec-4e13-11e3-be6b-d3d28122e6d4_story.html. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See Sabrina Tavernise, A Population Changes, Uneasily, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/18/us/18dc.html. 
 8. See infra Appendix. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
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jurors.11 But no jurisdiction prevents those who have merely been arrested from 
serving as jurors, unless those particular charges are pending at the time of jury 
service.12 Although arrests do not disqualify prospective jurors from serving, 
questions about arrests are routinely asked in voir dire all around the country.13 
Even when prospective jurors are not asked about arrests, background checks 
easily reveal any adult arrests.14 
While an Assistant United States Attorney who believes it to be unlikely for 
an African American life-long resident of the District of Columbia to have nev-
er been arrested suggests that she was acting on her own racial biases, her suspi-
cions are also a symptom of a broader issue: the racially disparate impact of this 
country’s discriminatory system of mass criminalization and incarceration. The 
prosecutor’s efforts to check arrest records effectuated yet another negative im-
pact of the racially unequal criminal justice system. But even the question ask-
ing prospective jurors about their arrest records and those of friends and fami-
ly—common questions across jurisdictions—and the implicit approval of using 
arrest records as a basis for either ad hoc “for cause” strikes or peremptory 
strikes compound the racially disparate impact of our criminal justice system.15 
A significantly higher percentage of people of color have arrest records due 
to the disproportionate number of stops, searches, and arrests of people of col-
or.16 Black17 people are also more likely to have friends and family who are 
Black.18 As a result, Black jurors are more likely than White jurors to have 
friends and family who have been arrested. Judges and prosecutors then use the 
existence of prior arrests of the jurors or the jurors’ friends or family to strike 
these prospective jurors, in effect producing juries whose racial compositions 
are whiter than that of the respective communities. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. In the District of Columbia, the jurisdiction where I practice, judges routinely ask, 
“Have you, a close friend or family member been arrested, convicted, or a victim 
of a crime in the last ten years?” New Jersey’s model criminal voir dire includes a 
question about whether the prospective juror, her “family member or close friend” 
has ever been “accused” of a crime. Model Jury Selection Questions, N.J. CTS. 
(2007), http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/jury/std_jury_quest_criminal.pdf.  
 14. See Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As Arrest Records Rise, Americans Find 
Consequences Can Last a Lifetime, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 18, 2014, 10:30 PM), http:// 
www.wsj.com/articles/as-arrest-records-rise-americans-find-consequences-can-
last-a-lifetime-1408415402.  
 15. See infra Part III. 
 16. See infra Part I. 
 17. I will use the terms “African-American” and “Black” interchangeably throughout 
this Article. 
 18. Up to 75% of White Americans do not have non-White friends. Race and 
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Almost thirty years ago, in Batson v. Kentucky,19 the United States Supreme 
Court held that prosecutors could not strike prospective jurors on account of 
the jurors’ race. In the most technical sense, striking a juror because of an arrest 
record could be considered “race neutral.” In practice, however, prosecutors 
use this reason to strike jurors to achieve the very end that Batson sought to 
prevent—a deliberately whiter jury. This Article explores whether, because of 
the racially disproportionate arrest rates of African Americans and Latinos20 
compared to Whites, using a peremptory strike on a juror who is a person of 
color because of his arrest record or that of his loved ones, is contrary to the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Batson. 
Prosecutors and private attorneys frequently investigate jurors’ back-
grounds. With limitations on voir dire, the amount of information learned in 
the courtroom is limited, and the parties frequently resort to stereotypes to em-
ploy strikes. Those parties with resources who are unwilling to simply rely on 
stereotypes now investigate jurors.21 Parties looking for race-neutral reasons to 
disqualify jurors of color also investigate jurors.22 Running a criminal back-
ground check of jurors is routine to those who investigate.23 
Even when prosecutors and private attorneys are not investigating jurors, 
standard voir dire questions posed by the parties and written questionnaires giv-
en to jurors before service begins include questions about whether the prospec-
tive juror or close friends and family have ever been charged with or arrested for 
a crime in a particular period of time, usually the past ten years.24 
 19. 476 U.S. 79, 92-93 (1986). 
 20. While Latinos are discriminated against and have higher incidents of arrests than 
non-Hispanic Whites, throughout this Article I make comparisons between 
Whites and Blacks without discussing Latinos. This is because of a lack of 
statistical clarity about the effects discussed here as they apply to Latinos. In many 
instances Latinos are considered an ethnic group rather than a race. The United 
States Census, for example, groups Americans into five racial groups: “American 
Indian or Alaska Native,” “Asian,” “Black or African American,” “Native 
Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander,” and “White.” The census further divides 
those five groups into: “Hispanic or Latino” and “Not Hispanic or Latino” ethnic 
groups. Hispanic Origin: Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http:// 
www.census.gov/population/hispanic/about/faq.html. Notwithstanding the 
unavailability of reliable data, I believe that the arguments I advance apply to 
Latinos as well as African Americans in most instances. 
 21. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous 
Personal Information, 102 NW. U.L. REV. 1667, 1690 (2008). DecisionQuest, a jury 
trial consultant company, advertises Jury Profiling as one of the services it offers. 
Trial Consulting & Research, DECISIONQUEST, http://www.decisionquest.com/ 
Public/Services/TrialConsulting/index.cfm. 
 22. See Alexander, supra note 1. 
 23. See infra Part III. 
 24. Gregory E. Mize, On Better Jury Selection: Spotting UFO Jurors Before They Enter 
the Jury Room, 33 CT. REV. 10, 11 (Spring 1999), http://aja.ncsc.dni.us/courtrv/cr36-
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Despite Batson, discrimination by prosecutors in jury selection persists.25 
Because this type of discrimination can easily be masked with an excuse that on 
its face is race neutral, examining whether an excuse like a juror’s arrest records 
is one that is truly race neutral is imperative. This Article will explore whether, 
because of the racially disproportionate arrest rates of African Americans and 
Latinos compared to Whites,26 using a peremptory strike on a juror who is a 
person of color because of his arrest record or that of his loved ones, is contrary 
to the Supreme Court’s holding in Batson. Part I examines how race affects the 
likelihood that a person will have an arrest record. Part II provides background 
regarding jury selection and Part III examines Batson and its progeny. Part IV 
discusses the constitutionality of strikes based on arrest records. This Article 
concludes with the common sense suggestion that questions about arrests dur-
ing voir dire should be precluded, as should the practice of using a person’s ar-
rest record as the sole basis for the exercise of peremptory strikes. 
 
I. The Systemic Racism of the Criminal Justice System 
 
The statistics demonstrating the racially disparate impacts of the criminal 
justice system are staggering. The disproportionate impact on people of color in 
the U.S. system is at every level—policing, arrests, prosecution, plea offers, trial 
outcomes, and sentencing outcomes. 
People of color are far more likely to be arrested in this country than 
Whites. By the age 23, 49% of Black males and 44% of Latino males have been 
arrested compared to 38% of White males.27 As of 2006, one in every 15 Black 
adult men was incarcerated compared to one in every 106 White men.28 
Whites and Blacks use and sell drugs at roughly the same rates, but Blacks, 
who are 12% of the population, account for 34% of those arrested for drug of-
1/CR36-1Mize.pdf (referring to a federal court in D.C. that asks, during voir dire, 
whether the prospective jurors, their close friends or close relatives have been 
charged with a crime in the last ten years). 
 25. See infra Part III. 
 26. Robert Brame et al., Demographic Patterns of Cumulative Arrest Prevalence By Ages 
18 and 23, 60 CRIME & DELINQ. 471, 476-78 (2014). 
 27. Id. 
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fenses.29 For example, Blacks are more than three times more likely than their 
White counterparts to be arrested for simple marijuana possession.30 
Some of the blame can be placed on police practices. In 2009, more than 
half a million people were stopped by the police in New York City—87% of 
them were African American or Latino, whereas only 53% of the population of 
New York City was African American or Latino.31 In the same year, Philadelphia 
boasted an even higher per capita stop and frisk rate than New York with 
253,276 stops in a city of only 1.5 million.32 72.2% of those stopped were African-
Americans, even though Blacks comprise just 44% of Philadelphia’s popula-
tion.33 A study in Los Angeles revealed that Blacks were significantly more likely 
than Whites to be stopped and frisked, however, Blacks who were frisked and 
searched (and Latinos, who were also more likely to be stopped and searched) 
were actually less likely to have weapons, drugs, or other incriminating evidence 
on their persons than Whites who were stopped.34 As of 2010, Black men are 
more than six times more likely to be incarcerated than White men in the Unit-
ed States.35 That is up from the 1960s.36 
Overaggressive policing begins early in the lives of Black youth.37 In New 
Orleans, almost 93% of children detained by police for curfew violations be-
 29. MARC MAUER, SENTENCING PROJECT, THE CHANGING RACIAL DYNAMICS OF THE 
WAR ON DRUGS 4 (2009), http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/dp 
_raceanddrugs.pdf. 
 30. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE WAR ON MARIJUANA IN BLACK AND WHITE 17 (June 
2013), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/1114413-mj-report-
rfs-rel1.pdf. 
 31. Press Release, Ctr. for Const. Rts., New NYPD Data for 2009 Shows Significant 
Rise in Stop-and-Frisks: More Than Half Million New Yorkers Stopped Last Year 
(Feb. 17, 2010), http://ccrjustice.org/newsroom/press-releases/new-nypd-data-2009 
-shows-significant-rise-stop-and-frisks%3A-more-half-million.  
 32. Erica Goode, Philadelphia Defends Policy on Frisking, With Limits, N.Y. TIMES (July 
11, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/12/us/stop-and-frisk-controls-praised-
in-philadelphia.html.  
 33. Complaint at 21, Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, No. 2:2010-cv-05952 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 
4, 2010), http://www.aclupa.org/download_file/view_inline/669/198/. 
 34. IAN AYRES & JONATHAN BOROWSKY, A STUDY OF RACIALLY DISPARATE OUTCOMES IN 
THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 5-6, 25-26 (2008), http://islandia.law.yale 
.edu/ayres/Ayres%20LAPD%20Report.pdf.  
 35. PEW RESEARCH CTR., KING’S DREAM REMAINS AN ELUSIVE GOAL; MANY AMERICANS 
SEE RACIAL DISPARITIES 20 (Aug. 22, 2013), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/ 
2013/08/final_full_report_racial_disparities.pdf.  
 36. Id. 
 37. See Robin Walker Sterling, Fundamental Unfairness: In re Gault and the Road Not 
Taken, 72 MD. L. REV. 607, 660-62 (2013). 
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tween 2009-2012 were Black.38 In Oakland, 78% of unfounded arrests were of 
Black children.39 A Black boy is nine times more likely to be detained for a drug 
offense as a White boy charged with the same offense.40 In 2008, children of 
color were 22% of the country’s youth population, but children of color ac-
counted for at least 43% of arrests for crimes against people and 35% of arrests 
for property crimes.41 
Police are not the only institutional players at fault. Prosecutors also play a 
substantial role. In some instances once charged by prosecutors with a crime, 
Whites are more likely than Blacks to receive diversion than blacks, even those 
with the same criminal record.42 Blacks also receive worse plea deals from pros-
ecutors than their White counterparts.43 In Manhattan, recent statistics show 
that even for misdemeanor drug offenses, Blacks and Latinos are 19% more like-
ly to receive a plea offer that requires imprisonment.44 Prosecutors are then 
more likely to recommend longer periods of confinement for Black defendants 
than White defendants at sentencing, even when all else is equal.45 
 38. Ramon Antonio Vargas, New Orleans Curfew Data: 93 Percent of Curfew Arrestees 
Are Black, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Mar. 28, 2013), http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/ 
2013/03/new_orleans_curfew_data_93_per.html. 
 39. BLACK ORGANIZING PROJECT ET AL., FROM REPORT CARD TO CRIMINAL RECORD: THE 
IMPACT OF POLICING OAKLAND’S YOUTH 15 (Aug. 2013), http://www.publiccounsel 
.org/tools/assets/files/0436.pdf. 
 40. Sterling, supra note 37, at 661. 
 41. CRYSTAL KNOLL & MELISSA SICKMUND, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY 
PREVENTION, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: DELINQUENCY CASES IN JUVENILE 
COURT, 2008, at 2 (2011), http://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/236479.pdf.  
 42. See Nancy Nicosia, John M. MacDonald & Jeremy Arkes, Disparities in Criminal 
Court Referrals to Drug Treatment and Prison for Minority Men, 103 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 77, 79 (2013) (“Dispositions for diversion to drug treatment were 
significantly less common among blacks relative to whites.”); Task Force on Race 
& the Criminal Justice System, Preliminary Report on Race and Washington’s 
Criminal Justice System, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 623, 647 (2012) [hereinafter Task 
Force] (noting that, in King County, prosecutors are 75% less likely to recommend 
alternative sentences for Black defendants than for similarly situated White 
defendants). 
 43. See BESIKI LUKA KUTATELADZE & NANCY R. ANDILORO, PROSECUTION & RACIAL 
JUSTICE PROGRAM, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTION AND RACIAL JUSTICE IN 
NEW YORK COUNTY: TECHNICAL REPORT 153 (2014), https://www.ncjrs.gov/ 
pdffiles1/nij/grants/247227.pdf (“[B]lack defendants are 10% more likely to receive 
the plea-to-the-charge offer than similarly-situated white defendants . . . .”). 
“[D]efendants’ race emerged as a statistically significant predictor of a custodial 
sentence offer . . . .” Id. at 161. “Black defendants were 19% more likely . . . to 
receive a punitive sentence offer, while differences between Whites and Latinos, 
and between Whites and Asians were not statistically significant.” Id. 
 44. Id. at 153, 161. 
 45. Task Force, supra note 42, at 648. 
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While prosecutors and police have largely been blamed for the racial ineq-
uities of our justice system, judges also contribute significantly to the dispari-
ties. Following conviction, whether for a felony or a misdemeanor, Blacks are 
more likely to get prison time as opposed to probation for the same charges and 
with the same criminal record.46 In a Vera Institute study of Manhattan crimi-
nal courts, race was found to be a significant factor at every stage of prosecu-
tions, from bail setting to plea offers to sentences received.47 Blacks and Latinos 
received worse pleas and received more jail time than Whites and Asians.48 
Judges are more likely to sentence Black defendants to jail time than White and 
Latino defendants.49 
There is emerging literature that even defense attorneys suffer from biases 
against their clients of color.50 While criminal defense attorneys perceive racism 
by other institutional players, they may suffer from a blind spot with respect to 
their own racism. Public defenders may have more unconscious racism, or im-
plicit bias, than they may realize.51 This could lead, for example, to an attorney 
encouraging a guilty plea for a Black client that she might not recommend to a 
White client. 
Given the above statistics, there is no question about the racial disparities in 
the criminal justice system.52 These disparities exist with respect to police con-
tacts, arrests, prosecution, and sentences received. These disparities harm the 
individuals that they directly affect and come at a great price for the nation—a 
diminished view of the justice system and a racial divide between the way that 
Whites and people of color view our criminal justice system. Sixty-eight percent 
of Blacks do not believe that the courts treat Blacks fairly, while only 25% of 
 46. David S. Abrams, Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Do Judges Vary in 
Their Treatment of Race?, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 347, 368-370 (2012) (finding that Blacks 
in Cook County, Illinois, were more likely to be sentenced to jail or prison than 
Whites). 
 47. James McKinley, Study Finds Racial Disparity In Criminal Prosecutions, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 8, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/09/nyregion/09race.html; see also 
Task Force, supra note 42, at 628 (“Among felony drug offenders, black defendants 
were 62% more likely to be sentenced to prison than similarly situated white 
defendants.”). 
 48. McKinley, supra note 47. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See Andrea Lyon, Race Bias and the Importance of Consciousness for Criminal 
Defense Attorneys, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 755, 761-62 (2012); L. Song Richardson & 
Phillip Atiba Goff, Implicit Racial Bias in Public Defender Triage, 122 YALE L.J. 2626, 
2628 (2013). 
 51. See Lyon, supra note 50, at 755, 762.  
 52. For a fuller discussion on the topic, see MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM 
CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010). 
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Whites agree.53 That a significant percentage of Americans perceive bias in our 
criminal justice system54 should concern prosecutors and courts greatly. 
Because of the way that jury selection takes place and because of the racial 
inequities in our criminal justice system, questioning prospective jurors about 
arrests will inevitably arm prosecutors who seek to discriminate with a basis to 
strike Black jurors. The subsequent strikes of Black jurors will only perpetuate 
these perceptions of the justice system in addition to leading to worse outcomes 
for Black defendants. 
 
II. Jury Selection 
 
Voir dire is a difficult process for the prospective juror. For almost all adult 
citizens, jury duty is an inconvenient burden: they are ordered to report during 
the work week and, if selected, may be required to remain for the completion of 
at least one trial, which can last from hours to weeks to months. Even the jury 
selection process frequently lasts hours and in some cases can last days or 
weeks.55 
Compensation for the prospective jurors’ time, if any, is minimal.56 This is 
time away from work, pay (for some), and family. In some jurisdictions, one 
 53. Frank Newport, Gulf Grows in Black-White Views of U.S. Justice System Bias, 
GALLUP (July 22, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/163610/gulf-grows-black-white 
-views-justice-system-bias.aspx. 
 54. Id.  
 55. See, e.g., Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1, 2 (2007) (“Here, 11 days of voir dire were 
devoted to determining whether potential jurors were death qualified.”); Miller-El 
v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 275 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Jury selection in 
Miller-El’s trial took place over five weeks in February and March 1986.”); Penry v. 
Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 801 (2001) (“Voir dire was a month-long process, during 
which approximately 90 prospective jurors were interviewed.”); Press-Enter. Co. 
v. Superior Court of Cal., Riverside Cty., 464 U.S. 501, 510 n.9 (1984) (“We cannot 
fail to observe that a voir dire process of [six weeks], in and of itself, undermines 
public confidence in the courts and the legal profession. The process is to ensure a 
fair impartial jury, not a favorable one. Judges, not advocates, must control that 
process to make sure privileges are not so abused. Properly conducted it is 
inconceivable that the process could extend over such a period. We note, however, 
that in response to questions counsel stated that it is not unknown in California 
courts for jury selection to extend six months.”). 
 56. See Mary R. Rose, A Dutiful Voice: Justice in the Distribution of Jury Service, 39 LAW 
& SOC’Y REV. 601, 608 (2005) (noting jurors are paid “about $12 per day in some 
locations”). Jurors in New York are entitled to $40 per day of service. N.Y. ST. 
UNIFIED CT. SYS., JURY INFORMATION FOR EMPLOYERS 2 (2009), http://www.nyjuror 
.gov/pdfs/hb_ee.pdf. Jurors in D.C. Superior Court receive $30 a day plus a $4 
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can be called for petit jury duty in both state and federal court, as well as grand 
jury duty in both state and federal court, one without regard for the other.57 
At the courthouse, the people called for petit jury duty may wait a substan-
tial period of time simply to find out if they need to report to a courtroom. The 
ones that are sent to a courtroom then participate in voir dire, in which pro-
spective jurors may be questioned by the judge or the lawyers for the parties (in 
a criminal case, the prosecutor and the defense attorney).58 
Typically, the panel, or venire, includes far more prospective jurors than 
will ultimately sit on the jury.59 For example, a panel of sixty prospective jurors 
may be called in order to ultimately create a jury of twelve jurors and two alter-
nates. All of the prospective jurors are assessed for fitness to serve on the jury 
primarily through questioning of the prospective jurors in open court, where 
the other prospective jurors can hear the answers.60 In some instances questions 
are posed to the entire venire while in other circumstances questions may be 
 57. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-5-25 (2013): 
  Every citizen over sixty-five (65) years of age, and everyone who has served as a 
grand juror or as a petit juror in the trial of a litigated case within two (2) years, 
shall be exempt from service if the juror claims the privilege. No qualified juror 
shall be excluded because of any such reasons, but the same shall be a personal 
privilege to be claimed by any person selected for jury duty. Any citizen over sixty-
five (65) years of age may claim this personal privilege outside of open court by 
providing the clerk of court with information that allows the clerk to determine 
the validity of the claim. Provided, however, that no person who has served as a 
grand juror or as a petit juror in a trial of a litigated case in one (1) court may 
claim the exemption in any other court where the juror may be called to serve.  
  J. DUKE THORNTON, TRIAL HANDBOOK FOR NEW MEXICO LAWYERS § 6:5 (1992) 
states: 
  Persons who have served as members of a petit jury panel or a grand jury in either 
state or federal court within the preceding 36 months shall be exempt from sitting 
or serving as jurors in any court of this state when they, at their option, request to 
be excused from service. 
  S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-7-850 (2000) provides: 
  No person is liable to be drawn and serve as a juror in any court more often than 
once every three calendar years and no person shall serve as a juror more than 
once every calendar year, but he is not exempt from serving on a jury in any other 
court in consequence of his having served before a magistrate. 
 58. For a description of jury selection, see Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 209-11 
(1965). See also generally ANDREW FERGUSON, WHY JURY DUTY MATTERS (2013). 
 59. Swain, 380 U.S. at 210 (“In Talladega County the petit jury venire drawn in a 
criminal case numbers about 35 unless a capital offense is involved, in which case it 
numbers about 100.”).  
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posed to prospective jurors individually.61 Before or on the day that they are 
summoned to appear, the venire members are sometimes given question-
naires62 containing questions to gauge their suitability for jury service. Depend-
ing on the jurisdiction, either the judge or the attorneys may conduct the voir 
dire.63 Based on the answers that potential jurors give to the general questions 
or the questionnaires, the attorneys or judge may pose additional follow-up 
questions to individual jurors. 
Many have complained that the voir dire process can feel like an invasion of 
privacy to jurors.64 The questioning is often personal, in some instances reveal-
ing information some would not share with friends and family—questions 
 61. FERGUSON, supra note 58, at 29. 
 62. See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 431 (2010) (“[T]he District Court began 
the jury selection process by mailing screening questionnaires to 400 prospective 
jurors in November 2005. The completed questionnaires of the 283 respondents 
not excused for hardship dramatically illustrated the widespread impact of 
Enron’s collapse on the Houston community and confirmed the intense animosity 
of Houstonians toward Skilling and his codefendants.”); see also Berghuis v. Smith, 
559 U.S. 314, 323 (2010) (“Smith also introduced the testimony of an expert in 
demographics and economics, who tied the underrepresentation to social and 
economic factors. In Kent County, the expert explained, these forces made 
African-Americans less likely than whites to receive or return juror-eligibility 
questionnaires, and more likely to assert a hardship excuse.”); Uttecht v. Brown, 
551 U.S. 1, 2 (2007) (“Here, 11 days of voir dire were devoted to determining 
whether potential jurors were death qualified. During that phase, 11 of the jurors 
the defense challenged for cause were excused. The defense objected to 7 of the 12 
jurors the State challenged for cause, and only 2 of those 7 were excused. Before 
deciding a contested challenge, the court allowed each side to explain its position 
and recall a potential juror. It also gave careful and measured explanations for its 
decisions. Before individual oral examination, the court distributed a 
questionnaire asking jurors to explain their attitudes toward the death penalty and 
explained that Brown was only eligible for death or life in prison without 
possibility of release or parole.”); Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 357 (1979) 
(“Under the challenged jury-selection system, before the jury wheel is filled 
women may claim exemption in response to a prominent notice on a jury-
selection questionnaire, and, prior to the appearance of jurors for service, women 
are afforded an additional opportunity to decline service by returning the 
summons or by simply not reporting for jury duty.”). 
 63. Twenty-three states have predominantly or exclusively attorney-conducted voir 
dire. Nine states and the District of Columbia have predominant or exclusive 
judge-conducted voir dire. Eighteen states have judge and attorney-conducted voir 
dire. See HON. GREGORY E. MIZE, PAULA HANNAFORD-AGO & NICOLE WATERS, 
NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS & STATE JUSTICE INST., THE STATES-OF-THE-STATES 
SURVEY OF JURY IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS: A COMPENDIUM REPORT 28 tbl.21 (2007), 
http://www.ncsc-jurystudies.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CJS/SOS/ 
SOSCompendiumFinal.ash.  
 64. See generally Michael R. Glover, The Right to Privacy of Prospective Jurors During 
Voir Dire, 70 CAL. L. REV. 708 (1982). 
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about whether one has been the victim of sexual assault or other crimes, atti-
tudes about the death penalty, the juror’s prejudices against any groups, and 
other controversial topics. In some jurisdictions these questions are posed in 
front of the entire jury venire.65 One legal observer has said that prospective ju-
rors risk “personal humiliation, damage to reputation and public embarrass-
ment resulting from having to answer probing personal questions.”66 Certainly, 
having to answer questions about prior arrests in a public courtroom can be an 
embarrassment to some prospective jurors. 
This invasion of privacy is outweighed by our society’s interest in fair trials. 
The entire voir dire process is aimed at identifying jurors who may have bias 
against a party.67 This is especially important in criminal trials where a person’s 
liberty is at stake—a juror with a bias against the defendant due to racial ani-
mus, for example, would need to be removed in order for the defendant to en-
joy a fair trial. The parties in the trial can move to have prospective jurors re-
moved, or struck “for cause,” if they are unfit for jury service.68 The parties get 
an unlimited number of strikes for cause because these strikes are reserved for 
jurors who are unfit for service, typically due to some sort of bias.69 
The prospective jurors who remain after “for cause” strikes can also be ex-
cluded through “peremptory” strikes exercised by the parties. Peremptory 
strikes are, by definition, arbitrary.70 The parties may strike jurors—without 
first seeking approval from the trial court—for virtually any reason, except 
race71 and gender,72 limitations discussed in greater detail below. The number of 
peremptory strikes varies by jurisdiction and may also vary depending on the 
type of case. In federal criminal trials, for example, the defendant is permitted 
 65. See, e.g., Hampton v. State, 103 So.3d 98, 113 (Fla. 2012); Bell v. State, 263 P.3d 840, 
842 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011). 
 66. Glover, supra note 64, at 712-13. 
 67. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965) (“The function of the challenge 
is . . . to assure the parties that the jurors before whom they try the case will decide 
on the basis of the evidence placed before them, and not otherwise.”). 
 68. Connors v. United States, 158 U.S. 408, 413 (1895) (“[S]uitable inquiry is 
permissible in order to ascertain whether the juror has any bias, opinion, or 
prejudice that would affect or control the fair determination by him of the issues 
to be tried.”). 
 69. RANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT, AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM 135 (2003) (“The attorneys 
can . . . challenge for cause any potential jury who they believe cannot be 
impartial.”); id. at 139 (“Challenges for cause, because they help assure an 
impartial juror, are unlimited in number.”); Janeen Kerper, The Art and Ethics of 
Jury Selection, 24 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 1, 24 (2000) (footnote omitted) (“In all 
jurisdictions, challenges for cause are unlimited.”).  
 70. Peremptory, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 71. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 72. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 149 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (extending 
Batson to gender). 
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ten strikes and the government is permitted six, while both sides have twenty 
strikes in a capital trial, but only three strikes in misdemeanor jury trials.73 
 
A. Investigation of Prospective Jurors 
 
The invasive nature of the jury selection process is exacerbated by counsels’ 
investigations of potential jurors beyond voir dire. In order to intelligently exer-
cise peremptory strikes, and in some instances to successfully move to strike a 
prospective juror for cause, attorneys on both sides of a criminal case want in-
formation about the prospective jurors. The voir dire process in which the judge 
or the attorneys for both sides are allowed to question jurors in open court is 
the primary vehicle for access to this information. Prosecutors (and defendants 
with resources), however, also conduct additional investigation into prospective 
jurors, including hiring jury consultants or investigators with expertise in re-
searching the backgrounds of prospective jurors.74 This investigation is accom-
plished through numerous means. Parties do anything from “Googling,”75 ac-
cessing IRS files,76 obtaining credit reports,77 searching property records,78 and 
reviewing a juror’s criminal record.79 
The use of arrest records—”rap sheets”—or law enforcement databases by 
prosecutors to investigate jurors is not rare. Prosecutors in Alaska,80 Califor-
nia,81 Colorado,82 Louisiana,83 Massachusetts,84 Michigan,85 Missouri,86 New 
 73. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b). 
 74. Eric P. Robinson, Virtual Voir Dire: The Law and Ethics of Investigating Jurors 
Online, 36 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 597, 606-07 (2013). 
 75. Id. at 620. 
 76. See, e.g., United States v. Costello, 255 F.2d 876, 882 (2d Cir. 1958). 
 77. See, e.g., United States v. Falange, 426 F.2d 930, 932 (2d Cir. 1970). 
 78. See, e.g., United States v. White, 78 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1026 n.1 (D.S.D. 1999); Skaggs 
v. Parker, 27 F. Supp. 2d 952, 1001 (W.D. Ky. 1998); State v. Hobbs, 282 S.E.2d 258, 
267 (W. Va. 1981); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of 
Ubiquitous Personal Information, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1667, 1690 (2008). 
 79. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 1; see also State v. Bessenecker, 404 N.W.2d 134, 136 
(Iowa 1987).  
 80. See Tagala v. State, 812 P.2d 604, 611 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991). 
 81. See People v. Murtishaw, 29 Cal.3d 733, 765 (Cal. 1981). 
 82. See Losavio v. Mayber, 496 P.2d 1032, 1033-34 (Colo. 1972). 
 83. See Louisiana v. Knighten, 609 So.2d 950, 955-58 (La. Ct. App. 1992); see also 
Louisiana v. Dabney, 633 So.2d 1369, 1375-76 (La. Ct. App. 1994). 
 84. See Commonwealth v. Cousin, 873 N.E.2d 742, 745-46 (Mass. 2007). 
 85. See People v. Aldridge, 209 N.W.2d 796, 797-98 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973). 
 86. See State v. McMahan, 821 S.W.2d 110, 112-13 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991). 
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Hampshire,87 New York,88 Vermont,89 Virginia,90 and the District of Colum-
bia91 have all admitted to participating in this practice. Only Iowa and New Jer-
sey have limited the practice. In Iowa, the parties only have access to a prospec-
tive juror’s criminal history with a court order after a showing of a reasonable 
belief that there might be information contained in the history relevant to jury 
selection.92 In New Jersey, a court held that, because of privacy concerns, prose-
cutors would not have access to the dates of birth for jurors that report for jury 
duty.93 Nevertheless, this decision appears to allow prosecutors to search for ar-
rest record information without using jurors’ birth dates. 
Even when conducted without regard to race, the government’s investiga-
tion of jurors puts indigent defendants at a significant disadvantage. Public de-
fenders and other court-appointed defense attorneys generally do not have the 
financial means for this type of investigation. The lawyer assigned to the case is 
usually the only one involved in the defense.94 Public defender offices rarely 
have consultants or investigators to conduct outside research while the attorney 
handles voir dire. The lawyer must remain in the courtroom to conduct voir dire 
and cannot conduct a simultaneous investigation. Public defender offices usual-
ly lack support staff, and there is no one to send out to conduct interviews or 
perform Internet searches, and most defense attorneys do not have access to 
confidential law enforcement databases.95 This is in contrast to prosecutors who 
can readily access this confidential information and also have the police at their 
disposal to conduct their investigations. 
Defendants have challenged the government’s use of venire members’ ar-
rest records during jury selection on the grounds that the use of the records vio-
lates state statutes about use of law enforcement databases or that the use of the 
records is unfair because the defense does not also have access to them.96 
 87. See State v. Goodale, 740 A.2d 1026, 1029-30 (N.H. 1999). 
 88. See People v. Burris, 275 A.D.2d 793, 794-95 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000). 
 89. See State v. Grega, 721 A.2d 445, 450-51 (Vt. 1998). 
 90. See Salmon v. Commonwealth, 529 S.E.2d 815, 816 (Va. App. 2000). 
 91. See Alexander, supra note 1. 
 92. State v. Bessenecker, 404 N.W.2d 134 (Iowa 1987). 
 93. In re Essex County Prosecutor’s Office, 46 A.3d 616 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2012). 
 94. See David A. Simon, Note, Equal Before the Law: Toward a Restoration of Gideon’s 
Promise, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 581, 586 (2008) (“Of the more than $146.5 
billion spent annually on criminal justice, over half is allocated to support the 
police officers and prosecutors who investigate and prosecute cases, while only 
about two to three percent goes towards indigent defense.”). 
 95. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, LAW ENFORCEMENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
(RMSS) AS THEY PERTAIN TO FBI PROGRAMS AND SYSTEMS (2010), https://www.fbi 
.gov/about-us/cjis/law-enforcement-records-management-system.  
 96. State v. Goodale, 740 A.2d 1026, 1029 (N.H. 1999); State v. Grega, 721 A.2d 445, 450 
(Vt. 1998); Tagala v. State, 812 P.2d 604, 611 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991). 
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III. Batson and its Shortcomings 
 
In Batson v. Kentucky, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed that 
prosecutors may not strike jurors simply because they are members of the de-
fendant’s race.97 Prior Supreme Court precedent in Swain v. Alabama98 and 
Strauder v. West Virginia99 held in that the government violates due process 
when it purposefully excludes jurors of the same race as the defendant. Quoting 
Strauder, the Court in Batson wrote, “the very idea of a jury is a body. . . com-
posed of the peers or equals of the person whose rights it is selected or sum-
moned to determine. . . persons having the same legal status in society as that 
which he holds.”100 
Batson, however, departed from the Court’s prior cases and removed the 
almost impossible burden imposed by Swain to prove discrimination by prose-
cutors.101 In order to determine whether a Batson claim has merit, the judge 
must consider whether (1) the defense has made out a prima facie case that ju-
rors were stricken by the government because of their race,102 (2) the prosecutor 
has race-neutral reasons for striking certain jurors of color,103 and (3) whether 
the dismissal of those jurors was the result of purposeful discrimination.104 
Batson was later extended to prevent prosecutors from peremptorily strik-
ing Black jurors even where the defendant was White.105 Batson has also been 
extended by the Court to prohibit racial discrimination in jury selection by de-
fense counsel as well.106 The Court has also prohibited juror strikes based on 
gender.107 
The reasoning of Batson goes beyond protecting criminal defendants to en-
compass safeguarding the reputation of our criminal justice system. As the 
Court explained, “[t]he harm from discriminatory jury selection extends be-
 97. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 98. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965). 
 99. 100 U.S. 303 (1880). 
 100. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986) (quoting Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308). 
 101. In tracing the jurisprudence in the area, the Court wrote that the lower court’s 
“interpretation of Swain has placed on defendants a crippling burden of proof, 
prosecutors’ peremptory challenges are now largely immune from constitutional 
scrutiny.” Id. at 92-93.  
 102. Id. at 96. 
 103. Once a prima facie case is made, then the burden shifts to the government “to 
come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors.” Id. at 97. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991). 
 106. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992). 
 107. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 149 (1994). 
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yond that inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to touch the entire 
community. Selection procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from 
juries undermine public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice.”108 
Being free from racial discrimination during jury selection under Batson is 
distinct from the entitlement that jurors come from a “fair cross-section” of the 
community. The “fair cross section” term comes from the right to have the jury 
pool be drawn from a fair representation of the community, a jury of one’s 
peers.109 That right comes from the Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial.110 Fair 
cross section claims address how citizens are called for jury duty. Batson derives 
from equal protection111 and Batson claims only address the way peremptory 
strikes are employed. 
There were high hopes for Batson’s significance. Commentators at the time 
described Batson as a “landmark” decision.112 The Washington Post called the 
case one of “historic importance” and wrote of the expectation that the decision 
would strengthen “public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice sys-
tem.”113 A writer for the New York Times called the case one of the “most im-
portant criminal law rulings in years” that would “protect the rights of black de-
fendants.”114 
Despite initial optimism, Batson has not effectively ended discrimination by 
prosecutors in jury selection. One observer wrote: 
Just as the legitimacy of our political system depends on equal suffrage, 
the court has repeatedly found that the credibility of our justice system 
depends on the fair treatment and full participation of all citizens. Nev-
ertheless, there is perhaps no arena of public life where racial bias has 
been as broadly overlooked or casually tolerated as jury exclusion.115 
 108. Batson, 476 U.S. at 87. 
 109. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 476-79 (1990). 
 110. Id. at 478; see also Tania Tetlow, Solving Batson, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1859, 1863 
(2015). 
 111. Holland, 493 U.S. at 476; see also Tetlow, supra note 110, at 1863. 
 112. E. R. Shipp, Peremptory Jury Challenges Face New Tests, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 1987), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1987/09/22/nyregion/peremptory-jury-challenges-face-
new-tests.html.  
 113. Impartial Jurors, Black and White, WASH. POST (May 10, 1986), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1986/05/10/impartial-jurors-black-and-
white/18c3895b-4210-4c28-95b0-61578f5390eb. 
 114. Stuart Taylor Jr., High Court Limits Excluding Blacks As Jury Members, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 1, 1986), http://www.nytimes.com/1986/05/01/us/high-court-limits-excluding 
-blacks-as-jury-members.html.  
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One study found that the success rates of Batson claims by criminal defend-
ants were “manifestly unimpressive,”116 with prosecutors more likely to prevail 
in bringing Batson claims than defendants.117 An examination of North Carolina 
criminal trials shows that blacks continue to be more than twice as likely as 
Whites to be successfully struck by prosecutors, even when controlling for other 
factors unrelated to race.118 
Other data suggests that Batson has had no impact at all on the number or 
frequency of prosecutor strikes against Black jury venire members.119 In Jeffer-
son Parish, Louisiana, “only 4% of jurors in post-Batson capital murder trials 
have been black,” despite a Black population of 23% according to the 2000 cen-
sus.120 Prosecutors in one Alabama county used more than 77% of their peremp-
tory strikes in murder trials against African-Americans.121 The District Attor-
ney’s office in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania struck 51% of the Black venire 
members in capital trials between 1981 and 1997.122 
There are a number of theories as to why Batson has failed. A significant 
barrier to a robust Batson doctrine is trial courts’ acceptance of facially race-
neutral, but likely pre-textual, explanations by attorneys of their peremptory 
strikes.123 Trial courts have upheld the removal of jurors for being renters, being 
single mothers, attending Black universities, being unemployed, looking nerv-
ous, speaking a foreign language, and other reasons that appear to be proxies 
for race.124 Because of the Batson framework, unless purposeful discrimination 
can be proved, judges accept prosecutors’ explanations for striking jurors of 
color. Arrests, so far, have fallen into the category of acceptable reasons to strike 
prospective jurors. 
 116. Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and 
Peremptory Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 459 (1996). 
 117. Id. at 459 tbl.B-1.  
 118. Catherine Grosso & Barbara O’Brien, A Stubborn Legacy: The Overwhelming 
Importance of Race in Jury Selection in 173 Post-Batson North Carolina Capital 
Trials, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1531, 1554 (2012). 
 119. David C. Baldus et al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: 
A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3, 73 (2001). 
 120. Samuel R. Sommers & Michael I. Norton, Race and Jury Selection: Psychological 
Perspectives on the Peremptory Challenge Debate, 63 AM. PSYCHOL. 527, 530 (2008). 
 121. Bryan A. Stevenson & Ruth E. Friedman, Deliberate Indifference: Judicial Tolerance 
of Racial Bias in Criminal Justice, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 509, 520 (1994). 
 122. Baldus et al., supra note 119, at 53. 
 123. Grosso & O’Brien, supra note 118, at 1541 (“One possible reason Batson has been so 
ineffective is the ease with which parties can generate race-neutral explanations for 
challenged strike decisions.”).  
 124. Leonard Cavise, The Batson Doctrine: The Supreme Court’s Utter Failure to Meet 
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Another theory as to Batson’s feebleness is that Batson requires parties to 
make a Batson challenge in order to get relief, and defense attorneys may toler-
ate discriminatory strikes by prosecutors because they themselves plan to dis-
criminate against White jurors.125 Judges may not want to rule against a prose-
cutor for fear it will harm the prosecutor’s professional reputation.126 After all, a 
sustained Batson challenge constitutes a finding that the party using its peremp-
tory challenge committed affirmative discrimination.127 And there seems to be 
little doubt that most trial judges are unwilling to find a Batson violation; two 
legal scholars have written, “[n]o evidence of bias has been too blatant for state 
courts to ignore.”128 
While Batson was an improvement over previous jurisprudence, the case 
has widely been criticized for not going far enough. Some scholars argue that 
Batson is a failure because of its focus on purposeful discrimination by prosecu-
tors and its failure to address implicit biases in jury selection.129 One legal schol-
ar has said that Batson is a failure because the decision is not rooted in the Sixth 
Amendment right to an impartial jury but instead the Fourteenth Amendment 
guarantee of equal protection.130 
Another argument that has been advanced is that Batson’s focus on color-
blind jury selection was at the expense of an impartial jury.131 And to the extent 
that the Court in Batson was worried about the prospective juror’s rights, there 
is no difference to the stricken Black juror between implicit or explicit bias that 
leads to the strike. 
Because of these criticisms and because it is relatively easy for prosecutors 
to hide racially-motivated strikes as long as they can articulate a convincing 
race-neutral reason for the strike, many scholars have called for an overhaul of 
 125. See Baldus et al., supra note 119, at 83-84 (“It is more likely . . . that the two sides 
tolerate one another’s discriminatory use of peremptories to reduce the risk that a 
successful retaliatory claim will be brought by the other side.”).  
 126. Jeffrey Bellin & Junichi P. Semitsu, Widening Batson’s Net to Ensnare More Than 
the Unapologetically Bigoted or Painfully Unimaginative Attorney, 96 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1075, 1116 (2011).  
 127. Id. at 1102 (“In sum, reviewing courts based all eighteen reversals on virtually 
conclusive proof that the prosecutor was not telling the truth. Which is to say, a 
reviewing court’s skepticism about proffered justifications that were far-fetched, 
tenuously connected to the case, strongly correlated with race, or irreducibly 
vague and ambiguous did not form the basis for granting the reversals.”).  
 128. Stevenson & Friedman, supra note 121, at 523. 
 129. Caren Myers Morrison, Negotiating Peremptory Challenges, 104 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 4-5 (2014); see generally Antony Page, Batson’s Blind-Spot: 
Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. Rev. 155 (2005). 
 130. Tetlow, supra note 110, at 1864-65.  
 131. Tania Tetlow, Why Batson Misses the Point, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1713, 1714 (2012). 
404 
 
Johnson FINAL COPY.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/29/2016 2:35 PM 
ARRESTING BATSON  
the peremptory strike132 or for the end of its use by prosecutors.133 Even three 
Supreme Court justices have called for an end or reconsideration of the prac-
tice.134 While fashionable in academia, this idea has no traction in practice. It 
seems that parties on both sides are unwilling to abandon the peremptory.135 
While the critique of Batson is substantial and legitimate, we must change 
the existing legal framework in order to address the troubling issue of discrimi-
nation in jury selection. Getting creative is important to try to make Batson ef-
fective. As discussed in greater detail below, this may be a good time to try new 
tactics. For better or worse, investigation of jurors is an increasingly popular 
technique used in jury selection. This tactic is used to either gather information 
about prospective jurors or identify “race-neutral” pretexts for striking jurors of 
color. One way to address this covert racial discrimination is to challenge, as vi-
olative of Batson, the use of strikes by prosecutors when they cite an African 
American or Latino juror’s prior arrest as a “race-neutral” basis for the strike. 
Delving into motivations behind reasons that are ostensibly “neutral” but dis-
proportionately likely to implicate race may be just one way of addressing these 






 132. See, e.g., Jere W. Morehead, When a Peremptory Challenge is No Longer Peremptory: 
Batson’s Unfortunate Failure to Eradicate Invidious Discrimination From Jury 
Selection, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 625 (1994); Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A 
Proposal to Eliminate Racially Discriminatory Uses of Peremptory Challenges, 31 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1099 (1994). 
 133. Maureen A. Howard, Taking the High Road: Why Prosecutors Should Voluntarily 
Waive Peremptory Challenges, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 369 (2010); Abbe Smith, A 
Call to Abolish Peremptory Challenges By Prosecutors, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1163 
(2014). 
 134. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 107-08 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring) (“We can 
maintain that balance, not by permitting both prosecutor and defendant to engage 
in racial discrimination in jury selection, but by banning the use of peremptory 
challenges by prosecutors and by allowing the States to eliminate the defendant’s 
peremptories as well.”); see also Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 344 (2006) (Breyer, J., 
concurring) (“I continue to believe that we should reconsider . . . the peremptory 
challenge system as a whole.”); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 273 (2005) (Breyer, 
J., concurring) (“I believe it necessary to reconsider Batson’s test and the 
peremptory challenge system as a whole.”). 
 135. Of 197 survey respondents, consisting of defense attorneys and prosecutors in 
almost equal numbers, only 2% thought that peremptory challenges should be 
eliminated. Jean Montoya, The Future of the Post-Batson Peremptory Challenge: 
Voir Dire by Questionnaire and the “Blind” Peremptory, 29 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 
981, 1009-10 (1996). “81% [of the lawyers surveyed] described peremptory 
challenges as having great value.” Id. at 1000. 
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IV. The Constitutionality of Strikes Based on Arrest Records 
 
The statistics leave no question: Black and Latino prospective jurors are 
much more likely to have been arrested than White prospective jurors.136 Allow-
ing prosecutors, the judge, or any party, to ask prospective jurors whether they 
have ever been arrested will necessarily reveal a potential basis for peremptory 
strikes for a disproportionate number of Black and Latino prospective jurors. 
Asking jurors about their arrest records or those of their close friends and 
relatives results in whiter juries via a number of mechanisms. First, a juror may 
be struck solely based on a prior arrest. Second, a juror who has been unfairly 
arrested likely has negative thoughts about police, and those thoughts may be 
articulated during individual voir dire, causing the juror to be subjected to a 
peremptory strike. Third, a juror may withhold information regarding his or 
her arrest record for many different reasons—including embarrassment about 
admitting to an arrest record in a public courtroom or confusion about the out-
come of his or her case. If the prosecutor or judge finds out about this misrep-
resentation, they will likely strike the juror for cause.137 Thus, allowing jurors to 
be questioned about arrests will result in fewer jurors of color because the an-
swers will provide a basis for prosecution strikes. 
While in the most technical sense striking a juror because of an arrest rec-
ord could be “race neutral,” that strike can be used by prosecutors to achieve 
the very end that Batson sought to prevent—a deliberately whiter jury. Blacks 
and Latinos are far more likely to have been arrested than Whites. When prose-
cutors rely on nothing more than the existence of an arrest record as a basis for 
exercising peremptory strikes, judges’ acceptance of this explanation permits 
disproportionate exclusion of Blacks and Latinos from juries. In effect, a symp-
tom of our racially unfair criminal justice system is used to perpetuate even 
greater racial disparities. 
 
A. Arguments in Favor of Questions and Investigations Regarding Prospec-
tive Juror’s Arrest Records 
 
Prosecutors are unlikely to admit that their goal in discovering the arrest 
records of potential jurors is to obtain whiter juries. Indeed these prosecutors 
may be unconsciously biased rather than carry racial animus. A number of re-
cent studies suggest that this is true for many Americans.138 Prosecutors, like 
 136. See supra Part I. 
 137. This is how it was uncovered that the prosecutor had run the records of the Black 
jurors in the case mentioned at the beginning of this Article. See Alexander, supra 
note 1. 
 138. Doctors have been found to discriminate in care given to Black patients. See Kevin 
A. Schulman et al., The Effect of Race and Sex on Physicians’ Recommendations for 
Cardiac Catheterization, 340 NEW ENG. J. MED. 618, 623 (1999). Blacks have been 
discriminated against in new car purchases. See Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, Race 
and Gender Discrimination in Bargaining for a New Car, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 304, 319 
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most of the legal profession, are disproportionately White when compared to 
the population as a whole,139 and therefore may be more likely to discriminate 
against Black jurors and defendants.140 
Rather than acknowledge their true motivations, prosecutors who strike 
Black jurors because of their race would likely argue that questioning prospec-
tive jurors about arrest records is potentially informative about the prospective 
jurors’ attitudes about police officers—someone who has been arrested is more 
likely to have negative views of law enforcement. Some courts have found strik-
ing a juror because of his dislike of police to be a race-neutral reason under Bat-
son.141 
This argument, however, has a number of limitations. First, prosecutors 
can discover prospective jurors’ biases against police officers through explicit 
questions about such biases, rather than questions or information about arrest 
records. In many jurisdictions, jurors are routinely asked if they have strong 
views about police officers.142 Second, while the police play some role in most 
(1995). Blacks are discriminated against in being shown apartments. See OFFICE OF 
POL’Y DEV. & RESEARCH, DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., HOUSING DISCRIMINATION 
AGAINST RACIAL AND ETHNIC MINORITIES 2012, at 39-43 (2013), http://www.huduser 
.org/portal//Publications/pdf/HUD-514_HDS2012.pdf. Politicians racially 
discriminate in responding to constituent mail. See Daniel M. Butler & David E. 
Broockman, Do Politicians Racially Discriminate Against Constituents? A Field 
Experiment on State Legislators, 55 AM. J. POL. SCI. 463, 468-72 (2011); Sendhil 
Mullainathan, Racial Bias, Even When We Have Good Intentions, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/04/upshot/the-measuring-sticks-of-
racial-bias-.html. 
 139. Although 13% of the United States population, Blacks make up under 5% of the 
nation’s attorneys as of 2010. QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html (last visited June 16, 2016); AM. 
BAR ASS’N, LAWYER DEMOGRAPHICS (2012), http://www.americanbar.org/content/ 
dam/aba/migrated/marketresearch/PublicDocuments/lawyer_demographics_2012
_revised.authcheckdam.pdf. Eighty-six percent of federal prosecutors are White. 
Geoff Ward et al., Does Racial Balance in Workforce Representation Yield Equal 
Justice? Race Relations of Sentencing in Federal Court Organizations, 43 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 757, 767 tbl.1 (2009).  
 140. Ward et al., supra note 139, at 757. 
 141. “Hostility toward law enforcement can be a race-neutral reason for striking a 
prospective juror.” Ex parte Crews, 797 So.2d 1119, 1121 (Ala. 2000) (citing Stephens 
v. State, 580 So.2d 11, 19 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990)) (“A hostile attitude toward law 
enforcement or dissatisfaction with the police has also been upheld as a sufficiently 
race-neutral explanation for the use of a peremptory challenge.”). 
 142. A standard voir dire question in D.C., where I practice, is, “In this case there may 
be witnesses called who are law enforcement officers. Would anyone have 
difficulty following my instruction that they must not give any greater, or lesser 
weight to a witness merely because he or she is a police officer?” Pennsylvania asks 
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criminal trials, the credibility of police is only at issue in some cases.143 There-
fore, in many cases even if a prospective juror harbors some negative feelings 
towards the police, it is unlikely to affect the outcome of the trial. Third, even 
focusing on prospective jurors’ negative feelings about the police is arguably 
unfair. As discussed above, Blacks are much more likely to have been discrimi-
natorily arrested so it is very likely their thoughts towards law enforcement will 
be deservedly more negative. In a 2014 Gallup poll, Blacks in the United States 
had a “significantly lower level of confidence in the police” than Whites.144 The 
experiences of individuals and their friends and family, as well as the statistics 
about unequal arrest rates,145 no doubt contribute to these negative perceptions. 
It is unfair to exercise a peremptory strike because the police target communi-
ties of color. Fourth, excluding jurors who have had negative experiences with 
police defeats one of the purposes of a jury of “peers:” members of the commu-
nity who will base their judgment on the experiences of the community. 
In response, prosecutors may argue that jurors may not admit to negative 
feelings towards the police, and that questions about arrest records combined 
with searches of arrest records can reveal when a juror has provided an inaccu-
rate answer. Prosecutors would likely argue that such jurors should be struck 
for cause because they are dishonest. In addressing a civil case where a juror 
failed to disclose information during voir dire, the Supreme Court stated, “the 
motives for concealing information may vary, but only those reasons that affect 
a juror’s impartiality can truly be said to affect the fairness of a trial.”146 
A juror who fails to disclose a police contact or arrest is not necessarily dis-
honest generally and may not deserve a for-cause strike. Embarrassment may 
play a significant role in answers. A juror may not want to admit to an arrest to 
strangers, or worse, to neighbors or co-workers who may be on the jury panel 
with them. In some jurisdictions, citizens may be asked about prior arrests in 
front of the entire venire.147 Other jurors may believe that the arrest was sealed 
or expunged and need not be disclosed. Ultimately, questions about arrest rec-




 143. There are many criminal cases in which police officers are only peripheral 
witnesses. In many robbery, rape, burglary, homicide, and other violent crime 
cases, the credibility of police officers is not a central issue. Rather, the accuracy of 
the identification or the credibility of the eyewitness is more important.  
 144. Frank Newport, Gallup Review: Black and White Attitudes Toward Police, GALLUP 
(Aug. 20, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/175088/gallup-review-black-white-
attitudes-toward-police.aspx.  
 145. See supra Part I. 
 146. McDonough Power Equip. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984). 
 147. Bell v. State, 263 P.3d 840, 842 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011); Eley v. State, 19 So.3d 124, 129 
(Miss. Ct. App. 2009). 
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B. How Batson Relates to Questions and Investigations Regarding Arrests 
 
While the Supreme Court’s holding in Batson was aimed at preventing ra-
cial discrimination in jury selection, some commentators have criticized the 
opinion for making it too easy for parties to engage in racially motivated per-
emptory strikes using farcical “race-neutral” explanations.148 For example, in 
Purkett v. Elem, the prosecutor justified a pattern of strikes against African 
Americans by claiming that he struck one Black prospective juror because he 
had long hair and another because he had a goatee.149 The Supreme Court sanc-
tioned these “race-neutral” reasons even though the prosecutor’s stated reasons 
for striking the Black prospective jurors bore no relationship to their ability to 
serve on the jury or on their potential views of the case. Although the Court in 
Batson suggested that explanations given in response to Batson challenges had 
to be “related to the particular case,”150 that suggestion carried little weight for 
the Court in Purkett v. Elem.151 
Purkett has been heavily criticized. One scholar has written that it “marked 
the final demise of the Batson doctrine into the rule of useless symbolism.”152 As 
an acceptance of a dubious supposed race-neutral explanation for the strike of a 
Black juror by a prosecutor, Purkett seems to suggest that the Court would have 
little problem accepting the prior arrests of a juror as race-neutral. While hair 
length and facial hair have nothing to do with how one would view the facts of a 
criminal case, arrests by police could inform one’s opinions about a criminal 
defendant. 
Since Purkett v. Elem, however, the Court has applied a higher level of scru-
tiny to the purported reasons offered to justify the use of peremptory strikes.153 
In the 2005 decision, Miller-El v. Dretke, the Court compared the responses of 
Black jurors who were struck by the government with non-Black jurors who 
were not struck.154 Trial prosecutors struck 10 out of the 11 Black jurors who had 
not been struck for cause.155 The Court used “side-by-side comparisons” to jux-
tapose the prosecutor’s reasons for striking some Black jurors with the infor-
 148. Cavise, supra note 124, at 527-45. 
 149. 514 U.S. 765, 766 (1995).  
 150. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 (1986). 
 151. Anna Roberts, Disparately Seeking Jurors: Disparate Impact and the (Mis)Use of 
Batson, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1359, 1369 (2012). 
 152. Cavise, supra note 124, at 528. 
 153. John P. Bringewatt, Note, Snyder v. Louisiana: Continuing the Historical Trend 
Towards Increased Scrutiny of Peremptory Challenges, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1283, 1286 
(2010). 
 154. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005). 
 155. Id. at 240-41. 
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mation known about the White jurors who were not struck.156 The Court paid 
close attention to the voir dire transcript and noted that non-Black jurors were 
not questioned at all after offering the same perspective as Black jurors who 
prosecutors challenged.157 The Court reversed the state court’s ruling based on 
this comparison.158 
The Miller-El Court’s lack of deference to the trial court’s findings was a 
departure from Purkett, in which the trial court’s views on the ostensibly “race-
neutral” reasons proffered were easily accepted by the Court. The Court also 
took into consideration the history of discrimination within the prosecutor’s 
office.159 The Miller-El reversal followed the 2003 Miller-El remand that cata-
logued Texas’s history of discrimination in jury selection.160 
In Snyder v. Louisiana, the Court found that a prosecutor’s stated reasons 
for striking Black jurors in a capital case were actually pretexts for discrimina-
tion.161 The prosecutor struck all Black potential jurors with his peremptory 
challenges. The Court once again engaged in juror comparison. With respect to 
one of the excluded jurors, the prosecutor claimed he was striking a Black male 
college senior because of concerns that the student would be overextended due 
to his academic obligations, even after the judge had spoken to the dean at the 
college to ensure that the student’s obligations would not interfere with his jury 
service.162 The Court compared the position of the college student who the 
prosecutor challenged with that of a White juror, not struck by the prosecution, 
whose wife had just had a hysterectomy.163 In reversing the death sentence, the 
Court rejected the professed “race-neutral” explanation put forth by the prose-
cutor and accepted by the trial court.164 
The Court’s willingness to engage in comparative juror analysis will be use-
ful in uncovering purposeful discrimination. One legal scholar has stated, “Mil-
ler-El v. Dretke can be seen as a step toward a reaffirmation of the Batson prin-
ciples.”165 Other commentators have opined that the Miller-El cases and Snyder 
v. Louisiana, viewed together, demonstrate an effort by the Court to inhibit ra-
cial discrimination in jury selection by looking deeper than the trial courts’ ac-
 156. Id. at 241. 
 157. Id. at 245. 
 158. Id. at 265. 
 159. Id. at 253. 
 160. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 346-47 (2003). 
 161. 552 U.S. 472, 485-86 (2008).  
 162. Id. at 481. 
 163. Id. at 484. 
 164. Id. at 473. 
 165. Bobby Marzine Harges, Batson Challenges in Criminal Cases: After Snyder v. 
Louisiana, Is Substantial Deference to the Trial Judge Still Required?, 19 B.U. PUB. 
INT. L.J. 193, 208 (2010). 
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ceptance of the prosecutors’ explanation of peremptory strikes.166 In Miller-El, 
the Court discussed the significant harm to people of color when prosecutors 
pick juries based on race. The Court also noted that “the very integrity of the 
courts is jeopardized” when jurors of color are discriminated against.167 
In light of its concerns about the integrity of the judiciary, one might imag-
ine that the Supreme Court would be equally skeptical if a prosecutor were to 
justify a pattern of peremptory strikes against African American prospective ju-
rors based on arrest records, a practice that would have a racially dispropor-
tionate impact. Supreme Court precedent—from the era of Purkett and before 
the more recent Miller-El and Snyder—creates a significant obstacle to such a 
challenge. 
In Hernandez v. New York, a case involving a Latino defendant, the prose-
cutor struck two bilingual jurors who were apparently Latino, on the basis that 
the jurors might not accept the interpreter’s representations of the Spanish-
speaking witnesses’ testimony.168 Although the Court was split, the majority 
voted to affirm the conviction, and held that a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause requires a finding of discriminatory intent, not just racially dispropor-
tionate impact.169 Justice Kennedy announced the judgment of the Court, 
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, and Justice Souter. Justice 
Kennedy highlighted “the fundamental principle that ‘official action will not be 
held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially disproportionate im-
pact’.” Rather, that proof of “‘racially discriminatory intent or purpose is re-
quired to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.’”170 Justice Kennedy 
did not address the petitioner’s argument that there was a high-correlation be-
tween Spanish-language ability and ethnicity in New York because the prosecu-
tor had identified other aspects of the two jurors’ specific responses and de-
meanor that caused him to doubt their willingness to adhere to the official 
interpretation of the Spanish-language testimony—reasons the trial court ac-
cepted in finding no discriminatory intent.171 
Justice Kennedy acknowledged that the prosecutor’s criterion for determin-
ing which prospective jurors would accept the official interpretation “might 
well result in the disproportionate removal of prospective Latino jurors,” but 
nevertheless concluded that such a “disproportionate impact does not turn the 
prosecutor’s actions into a per se violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”172 
Justice O’Connor, concurring, agreed that in order to demonstrate a violation 
 166. See Bringewatt, supra note 153, at 1301-04. 
 167. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 238 (2005). 
 168. 500 U.S. 352, 356 (1991). 
 169. Id. at 360. 
 170. Id. at 359-60 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 
264-65 (1977)). 
 171. Id. at 360, 366-67. 
 172. Id. at 361. 
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of Batson, a defendant must show intentional discrimination, and that “dispro-
portionate effects of state action are not sufficient to establish such a viola-
tion.”173 Justice Blackmun, dissenting, argued that once a prima facie case has 
been established by a pattern of strikes against jurors of a particular race or 
gender, “[a]n avowed justification that has a significant disproportionate im-
pact will rarely qualify as a legitimate, race-neutral reason sufficient to rebut the 
prima facie case because disparate impact is itself evidence of discriminatory pur-
pose.”174 
Hernandez significantly limits challenges to racial discrimination in jury se-
lection. The Supreme Court has not clarified whether, in light of Miller-El and 
Snyder, it is now less inclined to accept explanations for peremptory strikes that 
point to nothing more than a fact about the jurors that is itself racially dispro-
portionate. Indeed, in Miller-El, the Court overlooked the prosecutor’s pro-
fessed “race-neutral” explanation about one juror’s brother having been arrest-
ed and convicted in order to find a Batson violation.175 This might suggest that 
the Court does not take such a reason as particularly satisfactory. This fits in 
with the view taken by some that Miller-El and Snyder have “reshaped the hold-
ings of Hernandez and Purkett.”176 
 
C. Lower Courts Have Addressed the Issue of Arrests and Batson 
 
Lower courts have wrestled with the dismissal of prospective Black jurors 
based on their arrests or the arrest of family members. A federal district court in 
California recently considered whether the practice of striking jurors because of 
their arrests violated Batson. In Sifuentes v. Brazelton, a Batson claim was 
mounted based on nine peremptory strikes of African American jurors.177 Sev-
eral jurors were dismissed for cause for failing to disclose their criminal history 
on juror questionnaires.178 While the court did find Batson violations with re-
spect to two of the dismissed jurors, it also found that there was no evidence 
that their dismissal “was not racially neutral.”179 While the court did conduct 
comparative juror analysis, it did not consider the fact that Black jurors are 
more likely to have been arrested than White jurors. 
In 2004, the Sixth Circuit addressed a similar problem in United States v. 
Beverly.180 The trial prosecutor struck the only remaining Black juror on the ba-
 173. Id. at 372-73 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 174. Id. at 376 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 175. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 246, 266 (2005). 
 176. Harges, supra note 165, at 211. 
 177. 4 F. Supp. 3d 1181, 1193 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
 178. Id. at 1223-24. 
 179. Id. at 1227. 
 180. 369 F.3d 516 (6th Cir. 2004). 
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sis that she had a brother and nephew who had spent time in prison.181 The 
Sixth Circuit deferred to the district court and found that the prosecutor “gave 
[a] plausible and race-neutral explanation.”182 
The Missouri Court of Appeals encountered the issue in a 1994 case where 
the prosecutor used arrest records as a basis for peremptory strikes.183 On ap-
peal, the defendant alleged that the practice of using arrest records for peremp-
tory challenges was used in a racially discriminatory way.184 However, because 
the defense attorney did not make a Batson challenge at the trial level, the issue 
was not preserved, and the court of appeals did not reach the merits of the 
claim.185 
In Devoil-El v. Groose, a 1998 Eighth Circuit case, a prosecutor used all of 
his strikes to remove Black potential jurors.186 The reasons proffered by the 
prosecutor for some strikes were that the jurors had a relative in jail or who had 
been charged with a crime.187 The defendant argued that those reasons violated 
Batson because they had a disparate impact on African-Americans.188 The court 
relied on Hernandez, holding that there was no showing of intent to discrimi-
nate and therefore there was no Batson violation.189 
In 1994, the Court of Appeals of Louisiana did place some restrictions on 
prosecutors’ use of arrest records of prospective jurors. The court held that a 
juror’s arrest was a race-neutral basis for a strike of a juror190 but concluded 
that, if the arrest is the basis for a peremptory strike, the prosecutor must pro-
vide the defense with proof of that arrest,191 though more recent case law has 
done away with the proof requirement.192 
The South Carolina Court of Appeals found a Batson violation where a 
prosecutor struck two black jurors because they had previously been arrested in 
misdemeanor cases.193 The prosecutor used four of his five strikes on black ju-
 181. Id. at 527. 
 182. Id. at 517. 
 183. Missouri v. Childs, 876 S.W.2d 781 (Mo. App. E.D. 1994). 
 184. Id. at 783. 
 185. Id. at 784. 
 186. 160 F.3d 1184, 1186 (8th Cir. 1998).  
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 1187. 
 190. Louisiana v. Dabney, 633 So.2d 1369, 1375-76 (La. Ct. App. 1994). 
 191. Id. 
 192. Louisiana v. Bender, 152 So.3d 126, 130-31 (La. 2014). 
 193. State v. Stewart, 775 S.E.2d 416, 419-20 (S.C. Ct. App. 2015). 
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rors.194 Trial counsel pointed out that prosecutors did not strike two white ju-
rors who had previously been arrested, one of whom had actually been convict-
ed.195 Relying on Miller-El, the Court of Appeals found that prosecutors had 
“negated” their supposed race-neutral explanations when they failed to strike 
the similarly situated white jurors.196 The Court of Appeals reversed the convic-
tion because of the Batson violation.197 The disparate impact argument does not 
appear to have been made. 
These lower court decisions show that trial courts are clearly experiencing 
prosecutors using arrests as bases for strikes of African-American jurors during 
voir dire.198 While no court has found a violation of Batson based on the use of 
arrest records per se, it has certainly piqued the interest of trial courts and ap-
pellate courts alike. The trial court in Missouri v. Childs stated 
[I]n many cases the assistant Circuit Attorneys will go back to the office 
and run individuals who have appeared on the panel. It’s been my ex-
perience that in most instances they tend to be black persons, because 
the Circuit Attorney is trying to find reasons to sustain the striking of 
blacks on peremptory challenges.199 
Until more than a handful of appellate courts address this issue, trial courts 
will continue to narrowly apply Batson. Even when courts do perform compara-
tive juror analysis, the courts fail to consider disparate impact because Hernan-
dez tells them not to do so unless there is evidence of discriminatory intent. Ul-
timately some courts may find Batson violations so long as the prosecutor fails 
to strike White jurors with arrests or close associations with those who have 
been arrested. But for reasons discussed above, Whites are less likely to have 
prior arrests and less likely to have friends or family who have been arrested.200 
This will mean that for the most part prosecutors will continue to be allowed to 
strike Black jurors and tell trial judges that they did so because of the jurors’ ar-




 194. Id. at 419. 
 195. Id. at 420. 
 196. Id. at 421. 
 197. Id. 
 198. See Alexander, supra note 1. 
 199. Missouri v. Childs, 876 S.W.2d 781, 783-84 (Mo. App. E.D. 1994). 
 200. Nevertheless, because there are more White jurors than Black jurors on most 
criminal jury panels and because of mass incarceration’s long reach, there is still a 
significant chance that there will be Whites on any particular panel who have been 
arrested or have family or friends who have been arrested.  
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D. Beyond Batson: Why Trial Courts Should Seek More Diverse Juries and 
How To Achieve this Goal 
 
The Court in Batson explicitly recognized one value that can be derived 
from juries that reflect the racial demographics of the community: “In view of 
the heterogeneous population of our Nation, public respect for our criminal 
justice system and the rule of law will be strengthened if we ensure that no citi-
zen is disqualified from jury service because of his race.”201 
The importance of balanced racial representation on criminal juries goes 
beyond the important appearance-of-fairness issue identified in Batson. Because 
the criminal justice system focuses disproportionately on people of color, peo-
ple of color are more likely to be critical of that system—including the police 
and prosecutors—when assessing whether the prosecution has satisfied its bur-
den of proof in a particular case. On the other hand, White jurors are more 
likely to convict Black defendants. In a Duke study of Florida criminal trial rec-
ords encompassing a decade of information, all-White juries in Florida were 
16% more likely to convict Black defendants than White defendants.202 Thus, 
racial inequalities continue to expand through the justice system. This problem 
is then exacerbated when African Americans and Latinos are excluded from 
serving on juries because of arrest records because African American and Latino 
defendants are more likely to be convicted by juries that do not contain jurors 
of color.203 
  Prosecutors have long recognized the importance of juries that reflect 
the racial makeup of the community and have long sought to ensure that juries 
in criminal cases are as White as possible. The Court first addressed the prob-
lem in Strauder v. West Virginia204 in the year 1879; and, even today, prosecutors 
continue to use peremptory strikes to rid juries of African-American jurors.205 
Questions and investigations of prospective jurors’ arrest records are not 
the only cause of the racially disproportionate exclusion of African Americans 
and Latinos from juries.206 Individuals who are incarcerated or who have felony 
 201. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986). 
 202. Steve Hartsoe, Study: All-White Jury Pools Convict Black Defendants 16 Percent 
More Often Than Whites, DUKE TODAY (Apr. 17, 2012), https://today.duke.edu/ 
2012/04/jurystudy. 
 203. Id. 
 204. 100 U.S. 303 (1879). 
 205. EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, ILLEGAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION: A 
CONTINUING LEGACY (2010), http://www.eji.org/files/EJI%20Race%20and%20Jury 
%20Report.pdf. 
 206. Craig D. Frazier, Study Finds Blacks and Latinos Are Underrepresented in Jury Pools, 
NEW AMSTERDAM NEWS (Dec. 26, 2012), http://amsterdamnews.com/news/2012/ 
dec/26/study-find-blacks-and-latinos-are/ (reporting results of study showing that 
Blacks and Latinos are underrepresented as jurors in many New York 
jurisdictions); Editorial, Why So Few Black Jurors?, DETROIT FREE PRESS (June 3, 
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convictions are often barred from serving as jurors either permanently or for 
some period of time.207 In 2010, 25% of Black adults have felony convictions, 
while only just over 6% of the total adult non-African-American ex-felon popu-
lation has been convicted of a crime.208 Between the higher rates of felony con-
viction and the higher rates of incarceration, there is a disproportionately high 
number of African Americans who are rendered unqualified for jury service. 
Allowing peremptory strikes based on mere arrests only compounds this serious 
problem of underrepresentation of blacks on juries. 
Furthermore, juror rolls are usually derived from tax records,209 driver’s li-
censes records,210 and voter registrations211 in most jurisdictions. Driver’s license 
records result in the exclusion of African Americans from panels of prospective 
jurors. An estimated 25% of African Americans lack any form of state identifica-
tion,212 meaning they are less likely to be called for jury service based on state 
Department of Motor Vehicle records. Voter registration rolls are also affected 
by the disproportionate impact of the criminal justice system. The Sentencing 
Project estimates that almost 8% of Blacks are disenfranchised due to criminal 
convictions.213 
There are already fewer Black jurors called for voir dire than are representa-
tive of the population as a whole. The use of peremptory challenges based on 
arrest records against jurors who have not already been excluded based on the 
above factors only serves to perpetuate the underrepresentation of African 
Americans and Latinos on juries. Even if prosecutors do not explicitly violate 
Batson and the Equal Protection Clause when they rely on racially dispropor-
tionate factors like arrest records to exercise peremptory strikes, courts should 
not encourage this practice by permitting voir dire questions about arrest rec-
2012), http://archive.freep.com/article/20120603/OPINION01/206030445/Editorial-
Why-so-few-black-jurors (stating that in the federal judicial district in which 
Detroit is located, only 10% of jurors reporting are Black, while Blacks make up 
20% of the population). 
 207. See Alexander, supra note 1; see also infra Appendix. 
 208. Sarah Shannon et al., Growth in the U.S. Ex-Felon and Ex-Prisoner Population, 
1948-2010, at 7 (Working Paper, 2011), http://paa2011.princeton.edu/papers/111687.  
 209. See State v. Hester, 324 S.W.3d 1, 87-88 (Tenn. 2010). 
 210. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9.2 (1991); State v. Addison, 161 N.H. 300, 306-07 (Sup. 
Ct. 2010); Gholston v. State, 57 So.3d 178, 181 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010).  
 211. See, e.g., United States v. Neighbors, 590 F.3d 485, 491 (7th Cir 2009); United States 
v. Carmichael, 560 F.3d 1270, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009); Addison, 161 N.H. at 307. 
 212. KEESHA GASKINS & SUNDEEP IYER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CHALLENGE OF 
OBTAINING VOTER IDENTIFICATION 2 (2012), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/ 
default/files/legacy/Democracy/VRE/Challenge_of_Obtaining_Voter_ID.pdf.  
 213. Felony Disenfranchisement, SENTENCING PROJECT, http://www.sentencingproject 
.org/template/page.cfm?id=133 (last visited June 16, 2016). 
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ords or turning a blind eye to prosecutors checking the arrest records of pro-
spective jurors. 
This Article advocates for trial and appellate courts to find that striking ju-
rors of color based on arrests violates Batson. There are other solutions available 
at the trial level in the interim. Trial courts certainly have the discretion to pre-
clude questioning about arrest records during voir dire and preclude the investi-
gation of prospective jurors’ arrest records.214 Such questioning and investiga-
tion should be foreclosed in order to prevent—or at least limit—the deliberate 
use of this racially disproportionate factor during jury selection. This approach 
may appeal to judges as it would shorten the length of voir dire, as well as re-
move a justification for racially motivated strikes. Fair-minded judges, troubled 
by any type of racial discrimination, have no reason to allow questioning that 
unfairly exposes a disproportionate number of jurors of color to strikes that 
have no bearing on their fitness as jurors. 
Defense attorneys can raise the issue of voir dire on arrests pre-trial in a 
motion in limine before jury selection begins. If granted, this motion would 
preclude prosecutors from questioning jurors about prior arrests. For the de-
fense attorney, it also puts the focus on this issue and would preserve it for ap-
peal if the judge denies the request and the prosecutor strikes jurors of color cit-
ing their arrest record. The issue would then be ready for an appellate review. 
Another solution would be for individual jurisdictions to change court 
rules or enact statutes that ban questioning about arrests during voir dire. As 
many jurisdictions have “banned the box,” or prohibited employers from ask-
ing about arrests in initial hiring forms215, interested parties could seek a change 
in local practice rules or create statutes that prohibit that kind of questioning in 
voir dire. This approach would serve the interest of justice by ensuring diverse 




Given that the goal of voir dire is to identify prospective jurors who cannot 
be fair,216 a practice allowing otherwise fit Black and Latino jurors to be exclud-
ed from jury service calls into question the integrity of our criminal justice sys-
 214. See Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 310 (1931) (recognizing the trial court’s 
“broad discretion as to the questions to be asked” during the voir dire process). 
More recently, in Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 386 (2010), the Court stated 
that “[n]o hard-and-fast formula dictates the necessary depth or breadth of voir 
dire.” 
 215. William Harless, ‘Ban the Box’ Laws Make Criminal Pasts Off-Limits, WALL ST. J. 
(Aug. 3, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB10001424127887323997004578640623464096406. 
 216. See Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 431 (1991) (“Voir dire examination serves the 
dual purposes of enabling the court to select an impartial jury and assisting 
counsel in exercising peremptory challenges.”); see also Aldridge, 283 U.S. 308. 
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tem. Voir dire is largely at the discretion of the trial judge,217 and there is no ob-
stacle to trial courts precluding questioning about arrests. Without questioning 
about arrests and without investigation into jurors’ arrest records, prior arrests 
would not be available as a basis for peremptory challenges or justifications for 
a pattern of strikes against jurors of a particular race. Given that many have 
called for an end or limitations to the use of peremptory challenges,218 limiting 
the questions asked about arrest records is one way to narrow the potential ra-
cially disparate impact of peremptory challenges. 
Allowing voir dire on the issue of prior arrests or arrests of loved ones un-
necessarily injects race into the voir dire process in light of the unfortunate reali-
ties of our current criminal justice system. Given that an arrest by itself is not a 
for-cause basis for disqualification as a juror anywhere in the United States, it 
should not be offered as a race-neutral reason for the use of a peremptory 
strike, nor should courts or the parties inquire about it. 
In cases where police credibility is a central issue, in order to uncover in-
formation about alleged biases against law enforcement, the trial judge may ask 
a more neutral question such as “Do any of you harbor such negative views 
about police or prosecutors that would hinder your ability to judge this case 
fairly?”219 Should a juror raise an issue about an experience with an arrest, fol-
low-up questions could be asked. A question along these lines is more appro-
priate since it will (1) provoke answers that directly demonstrate potential for 
bias and (2) identify people who have not been formally arrested but neverthe-
less harbor negative feelings about law enforcement. But jurors should not rou-
tinely be asked about arrests unless they themselves raise the issue. In addition 
to precluding preliminary questions about arrest records, trial courts should 
preclude prosecutors from reviewing the arrest records of prospective jurors. 
Without action by judges and defense attorneys who can educate judges, 
African American and Latino jurors will continue to be unfairly excluded from 
jury service. Defendants of color will suffer as a result, in a system already work-
ing against them. Batson could have renewed meaning with an end to the prac-
tice of excluding Blacks and Latinos from jury service because of mere arrests. 
 217. See sources cited supra note 214.  
 218. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 103 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring); Morris 
B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished: A Trial Judge’s 
Perspective, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 864 (1997); Ogletree, supra note 132. 
 219. However, it is not at all clear that dismissing a juror because of negative opinions 
about police would be a basis for a challenge for cause in light of the many reasons 
that the police testimony can be called into question. In 2014, fifty-five New York 
Police Department officers had been sued ten or more times in the prior decade. 
Barry Paddock et al., Detective is NYPD Most-Sued Cop, With 28 Lawsuits Filed 
Against Him Since 2006, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 16, 2014), http://www.nydailynews 
.com/new-york/lawsuits-nypd-double-decade-costing-taxpayers-1b-article-1 
.1615919; see also Aubrey Whelan, 90-Plus Arrests of D.C. Cops in Under 4 Years, 
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JURISDICTION RESTRICTIONS ON JURY SERVICE 
Federal Prohibits those with pending charges or any felony 
conviction. 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(5) (2000) 
(disqualifying from grand and petit juries anyone 
who “has a charge pending against him for the 
commission of, or has been convicted in a State or 
Federal court of record of, a crime punishable by 
imprisonment for more than one year and his civil 
rights have not been restored”). 
Alabama Protects jury service for those who have “not lost the 
right to vote by conviction for any offense involving 
moral turpitude.” ALA. CODE § 12-16-60(a)(4) (2016). 
Allows challenges for cause if juror “has been 
convicted of a felony.” Id. 12-16-150(5). Also 
disqualifies those with pending felony charges, or 
charges for “an offense of the same character as that 
with which the defendant is charged.” Id. § 12-16-
150(3). 
Alaska Disqualifies anyone who “has been convicted of a 
felony for which the person has not been 
unconditionally discharged,” ALASKA STAT.  
§§ 09.20.020(2), 33.30.241(b) (2015), which is defined 
as release from imprisonment, parole, and probation. 
Id. § 12.55.185(18). 
Arizona Suspends jury service “right” upon felony conviction. 
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-904(A)(3) (2015). Felony 
convicts are disqualified from grand or petit jury 
service “unless [their] civil rights have been restored.” 
Id. § 21-201(3); see § 13-912(A) (restoring 
“automatically” first-time offenders’ civil rights after 
completion of sentence). 
Arkansas Disqualifies from grand or petit jury service those 
“who have been convicted of a felony and have not 
been pardoned” and those who are “not of good 
character or approved integrity,” are “lacking in 
sound judgment or reasonable information,” are 
“intemperate,” or are “not of good behavior.” ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 16-31-102(a)(4)-(5) (2016). 
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JURISDICTION RESTRICTIONS ON JURY SERVICE 
California Disqualifies those “who have been convicted of 
malfeasance in office or a felony, and whose civil 
rights have not been restored.” CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 
§ 203(a)(5) (2016). 
Colorado Disqualifies “prospective grand juror[s]” who have 
“previously been convicted of a felony” but not 
mentioning petit jurors. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-71-
105(3) (2015). 
Connecticut Disqualifies anyone who “has been convicted of a 
felony within the past seven years or is a defendant in 
a pending felony case or is in the custody of the 
Commissioner of Correction.” CONN. GEN. STAT.  
§ 51-217(a)(2) (2015). 
Delaware Disqualifies “[c]onvicted felons who have not had 
their civil rights restored.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,  
§ 4509(b)(6) (2016). 
District of Columbia Disqualifies felons for “not less than one year after the 
completion of the term of incarceration, probation, 
or parole.” D.C. CODE § 11-1906(b)(2)(B) (2016); see 
also JURY PLAN FOR THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA § 7 (2013) (requalifying felons 
for jury service ten years after “the completion of the 
juror’s incarceration, probation, supervised release or 
parole”). 
Florida Disqualifies those who have committed an “offense 
that is a felony in this state or which if it had been 
committed in this state would be a felony, unless 
restored to civil rights.” FLA. STAT. § 40.013(1) (2015). 
Georgia Disqualifies “[a]ny individual who has been convicted 
of a felony in a state or federal court who has not had 
his or her civil rights restored.” GA. CODE ANN. § 15-
12-60(c)(1) (2016); see also § 17-7-95(c) (specifying that 
conviction based on nolo contendere plea does not 
disqualify one from service). 
Hawaii Disqualifies those “convicted of a felony in a state or 
federal court and not pardoned.” HAW. REV. STAT.  
§ 612-4(b)(2) (2015). 
Idaho Specifies suspension of civil rights during 
incarceration and restoration of “all civil rights that 
are not political” during parole or probation. IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 18-310(1) (2016). 
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JURISDICTION RESTRICTIONS ON JURY SERVICE 
Indiana Disqualifies any person who “has had the right to vote 
revoked by reason of a felony conviction and the right 
has not been restored.” IND. CODE ANN. § 33-28-5-
18(b)(5) (2016). 
Iowa Makes both civil and criminal jurors challengeable for 
cause for “[c]onviction of a felony.” IOWA CODE ANN. 
§ 1.915(6)(a) (2015). 
Kansas Disqualifies any “person who has been convicted in 
any state or federal court of a felony” until he “has 
completed the terms of the authorized sentence.” 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6613(a)-(b) (2015). Further 
excuses anyone who “within 10 years immediately 
preceding” has been convicted or pleaded guilty to a 
felony. Id. § 43-158(c). In Kansas, a felon is not 
discharged from parole or probation until the 
prisoner review board issues him a certificate of 
discharge, which it cannot do until a year after the 
end of parole or probation. Id. § 22-3722. 
Kentucky Disqualifies one who “[h]as been previously 
convicted of a felony and has not been pardoned or 
received a restoration of civil rights.” KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 29A.080(2)(e) (2015). 
Louisiana Disqualifies from criminal jury service one “convicted 
of a felony for which he has not been pardoned” or 
“under indictment for a felony.” LA. CODE CRIM. 
PROC. ANN. art. 401(A)(5) (2015). 
Maryland Excludes persons “convicted . . . of a crime 
punishable by imprisonment exceeding 6 months and 
received a sentence of imprisonment for more than 6 
months” or “[h]as a charge pending . . . for a crime 
punishable by imprisonment exceeding 6 months.” 
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 8-103(b)(4)-(5) 
(2016). 
Massachusetts Disqualifies one who “has been convicted of a felony 
within the past seven years or is a defendant in 
pending felony case or is in the custody of a 
correctional institution.” MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
234A, § 4(7) (2016). 
Mississippi Qualifies for service only those who have not been 
convicted of a felony or the “unlawful sale of 
intoxicating liquors within a period of five years.” 
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 13-5-1, 1-3-19 (2015). 
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JURISDICTION RESTRICTIONS ON JURY SERVICE 
Missouri Disqualifies “[a]ny person who has been convicted of 
a felony, unless such person has been restored to his 
civil rights.” MO. REV. STAT. § 494.425(4) (2015). 
Persons convicted of a felony “shall be forever 
disqualified from serving as a juror.” Id. § 561.026(3).  
Nebraska Disqualifies “persons who have been convicted of a 
criminal offense punishable by imprisonment in a 
Department of Correctional Services adult 
correctional facility, when such conviction has not 
been set aside or a pardon issued.” NEB. REV. STAT.  
§§ 25-1601(1)(f) (2016); see id. § 29-112.  
Nevada Qualifies those “who ha[ve] not been convicted of 
treason, a felony, or other infamous crime.” NEV. 
REV. STAT. 6.010 (2015). 
New Hampshire States that “[a] juror shall not have been convicted of 
any felony unless the conviction has been annulled.” 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 500-A:7-a(V) (2016). 
New Jersey Requires that jurors “shall not have been convicted of 
any indictable offense under the laws of this State, 
another state, or the United States.” N.J. STAT. ANN.  
§ 2B:20-1(e) (2015). 
New Mexico Requires for eligibility that a person convicted of a 
felony complete “all conditions of the sentence 
imposed for the felony, including conditions for 
probation or parole.” N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-5-1 
(2015). 
North Carolina Qualifies persons who “have not been convicted of a 
felony . . . (or if convicted . . . have had their 
citizenship restored pursuant to law).” N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 9-3 (2015). In North Carolina, civil rights are 
restored automatically upon conditional discharge 
from prison, parole, or probation. Id. § 13-1. 
North Dakota Disqualifies anyone who “[h]as lost the right to vote 
because of imprisonment in the penitentiary . . . or 
conviction of a criminal offense which by special 
provision of law disqualified the prospective juror for 
such service.” N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-09.1-08(2)(e) 
(2015). 
Ohio Declares a person convicted of a felony “incompetent 
to be . . . [a] juror.” OHIO REV. CODE ANN.  
§ 2961.01(A)(1) (2015). 
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Oklahoma Disqualifies “[p]ersons who have been convicted of 
any felony” if not “fully restored to his or her civil 
rights.” OKLA. STAT. tit. 38, § 28(C)(5) (2015). 
Oregon Restricts criminal jury service to those not convicted 
of or who served sentences for a felony within the last 
fifteen years, or convicted of a “misdemeanor 
involving violence or dishonesty” within last five 
years. OR. CONST. art. I, § 45(1)(a)-(b) (2014). 
Pennsylvania Disqualifies one who “has been convicted of a crime 
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year 
and has not been granted a pardon or amnesty 
therefor.” 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4502(a)(3) 
(2015). 
Rhode Island Bars service from one “convicted of a felony. . . until 
completion of such felon’s sentence, served or 
suspended, and of parole or probation.” R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 9-9-1.1(c) (2015). 
South Dakota Disqualifies “[a]ny person who has been convicted of 
a felony unless restored to civil rights.” S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 16-13-10 (2016). 
Tennessee Disqualifies those “convicted of a felony or any other 
infamous offense in a court of competent 
jurisdiction,” as well as “[p]ersons convicted of 
perjury or subordination of perjury.” TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 22-1-102(1)-(2) (2015). 
Texas Disqualifies persons “convicted of misdemeanor theft 
or a felony.” TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 62.102(8) 
(2015). 
Utah Disqualifies anyone “who has been convicted of a 
felony which has not been expunged.” UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78B-1-105(2) (2015). 
Vermont Qualifies those who “ha[ve] not served a term of 
imprisonment in this state after conviction of a 
felony.” VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 962(a)(5) (2015). 
Virginia Disqualifies anyone “convicted of treason or a 
felony.” VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-338(2) (2016). 
Washington Disqualifies anyone “convicted of a felony and has 
not had his or her civil rights restored.” WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2.36.070(5) (2015). 
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West Virginia Disqualifies one “convicted of perjury, false swearing 
or any crime punishable by imprisonment in excess of 
one year under the applicable law of this state, 
another state or the United States.” W. VA. CODE  
§ 52-1-8(b)(6) (2015). 
Wisconsin Disqualifies anyone who “has been convicted of a 
felony and has not had his or her civil rights 
restored,” WIS. STAT. ANN. § 756.02 (2015), where 
rights are restored upon completion of sentence. Id.  
§ 304.078. 
Wyoming Disqualifies any “person who has been convicted of 
any felony” and not had rights restored. WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 1-11-102 (2015). 
 
 
424 
